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on the back burner for at least another year and the idea of an internationaleconomic summit has been embraced explicitly by the South . The taskawaiting Southern diplomacy now is to convert this dramatic shifting of gearsinto political action in order to secure the necessary Northern response .
INTRODUCTION
18
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE 1980s
Graciela Chichilnisky
Geoffrey M. Heal
In international circles, the concern of the day is with the state of the
world economy. There is a general appreciation ofthe severity ofthe problem,
but no widespread agreement about either diagnosis or solutions . We shall
locus here on a particular set of topics that have emerged as major issues dur-
ing the last decade, and that also seem central to an understanding of the
present economic situation. A characteristic of these topics is that they link in-
ternational and domestic policy areas in so integral a way that neither can be
analyzed in isolation from the other. They are :
" First, the recurrence of recession and unemployment in industrial countries, and the
emergence of protectionism
" Second, the changing international environment facing the developing coun-
tries and, in particular, the issues of export-led strategies and North-South trade in
armaments
" Third, the pricing of exhaustible resources, including oil, as a major issue in North-
South trade, and in the international financial system
" Fourth, the role of declining transfers of wealth from industrial to developing coun-
tries, and the perceived limitations of the existing international financial institu-
tions
These are difficult but interesting times. We are currently witnessing .
changes in the positions of industrial and developing countries in the world
economy, and in their interrelationships . On the whole, developing countries
This chapter was originally prepared in partial fulfillment of a contract between UNCTAD
and UNITAR, under which the authors undertook to assist the Secretary-General of UNCTAD
in the preparation of material relevant to UNCTAD-Vl.
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have grown more, and invested a relatively larger part of their GNP, than the
industrial countries in the last ten years. They have also increased significantly
their role as export markets for the OECD countries (with their share of
OECD exports currently 40 percent of the total), and have in addition greatly
increased trade among themselves . These developments have been partly the
result of resource pricing policies, and partly the result of a decline in the com-
petitive position of industrial countries . This has occurred both in traditional
heavy industries such as steel and also in skill-intensive manufactures such as
electronics . The reverse side of this coin is that many developing countries
have increased their need for food imports from industrial countries.
Financial markets mirror the developments in real markets, and the cur-
rent strains in the international monetary system reflect the lag with which our
institutions adjust to a changing world economy. For example, high interest
rates in the United States and the United Kingdom were partly a domestic
response to concerns about the inflationary impact of higher oil prices .
Because of the increased interdependence in the world economy, these higher
interest rates led to unexpected international consequences . Their threefold
increase in the four years to 1980 increased significantly the costs of servicing
debt and added impetus to the international debt crisis . The outcome of this
has been to bring about a far bigger transfer of power to the Third World than
was ever expected to come about through global negotiations . The leverage
that debtors enjoy, because of their capacity to damage the reserves of the
Western banking system is formidable . The IMF has responded by voting to
increase its quotas by 47 percent, a dramatic departure from its previous
record . The Inter-American Development Bank also recently voted to in-
crease its lending by one-third . A natural sequel to this would be a revision of
IMF loan conditions to take into account international factors, that is, the im-
pact of deflationary policies in developing countries on OECD export
markets.
In such a rapidly evolving economic environment, it is inevitable that our
analytical tools will require revising and adapting . Rather than succumbing to
the appeal of familiar and reassuring concepts, one must move ahead toward a
more realistic conceptualization of the problems and a more practical ap-
proach to their solutions . This chapter proposes economic tools for analyzing
and managing changes in the world economy. The relationship between
domestic and international factors, and their impact on the evolution ofthe in-
ternational economy, is the subject matter of the chapter.
The remainder of this section enumerates the issues that arise in connec-
tion with the four topics mentioned above, indicating the orientation of the
analysis, and the general thrust of the arguments. The remaining sections are
concerned with analyzing the main issues in detail and deriving conclusions .
We begin with an overview of the macroeconomic situation of the industrial
market economies, as a basis for the analysis of the international economic
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situation . In particular, we emphasize the relationship between macroeco-
nomic problems and modern industrial structures in the industrial economies.
The next sections are then concerned with the growth of protectionism and the
emergence of managed trade, an evaluation of export-led strategies and ofar-
mament trade, the role of transfers and of international financial institutions,
and the issue of resource pricing . Each section contains both an economic
analysis of the main issues and an indication of the policy implications of the
analysis . The overall conclusions are drawn together in a final section, where
they are also illustrated by reference to particular examples .
FOUR MAIN TOPICS
1 . Several factors underlie the rise of protectionism in industrial coun-
tries . One is the recurrence and increasing severity of recession and
unemployment, which historically have been associated with demands for pro-
tection. Another is the changing structure of international trade, including the
emergence of newly industrialized countries, which led to a new and intense
competition in fields central to the industrial economies. Examples are the
automobile and steel industries, which are important sources of employment,
and of demand for the inputs to other industries .
It will be argued that the pressures for protectionism represent in part a
failure to adjust industrial structures to changes in the international economic
environment . To the extent that this delays much-needed adjustments in in
dustrial structure, protectionism may harm the industrial countries at least as
much as the exporting countries. We shall also argue that even if there were
rapid structural adjustment in the industrial countries, an across-the-board
liberalization of trade would be neither a likely event nor necessarily
a
desirable one. Trade policy must be developed in a more selective and in-
tegrated manner .
2. In view of the present international economic environment, there
is
increasing concern about the role of export-led development strategies,
especially those based on the exports of traditional labor-intensive com-
modities from the South. International organizations have emphasized
export-led policies in recent years, frequently in response to balance-of-
payments deficits in developing countries, but also as an overall policy recom-
mendation for the development of the South. This originated partly from the
apparent success of particular developing countries that pursued vigorous
export-led strategies in the early 1970s.
The economic basis for export-led strategies arises from a particular view
of economic development and of the international division of labor, and from
a belief in the need for external "engines ofgrowth" for developing
countries.
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Both views are being questioned at present . In addition, correlations havebeen found between commodity export earnings and armaments imports, andthese also raise doubts about export-led strategies . We shall discuss the limita-tions of export-led policies and the possible alternatives . A general endorse-
ment cannot be given to one of the obvious alternatives, import substitution,
as more selective strategies are needed . We shall analyze the extent to which
domestic rather than international markets can be viewed as internal engines
of growth for the development of the South.
3 . Following a long period of inexpensive energy, the emergence ofenergy constraints in industrial countries has underlined the importance oftrade and pricing policies for extractive resources . For the last decade, these
policies have been a major policy concern of industrial and developing coun-
tries . Furthermore, because of uneven patterns of consumption and en-
dowments, exhaustible resources have emerged as a central issue in North-
South trade.
Traditionally the pricing of extractive resources has been seen as a source
of North-South conflict . However, the changes in the price of oil have-forged a
strong interdependence between the North and the South, both in real and in
financial markets. Because of this, there is at present more community of in-
terest between importers and exporters than is generally understood .
Economic analysis can substantiate this both in theoretical and empirical
terms, providing a motivation for suggesting cooperative pricing policies for
extractive resources . We shall discuss this suggestion in light of the impact of
resource prices on the macroeconomy of the importing region . In addition,
the recent experience of the impact of oil exports on economies such as
Mexico, Venezuela, and Nigeria runs counter to conventional wisdom . This
underscores the need for careful coordination of international and domestic
policies .
4. The issue of North-South transfers has been discussed for many years
in the international development community, where it has represented a cor-
nerstone ofefforts to reduce North-South wealth differentials . However, there
has been a consistent downward trend in such transfers in recent years, so that
they are currently not meeting even half the minimum UN targets . Further-
more, in view of the recession in industrial countries, the issue of North-South
transfers presently lacks immediacy.
Developing countries have on average sustained higher growth rates and
savings rates than industrial countries in the last decade : Their investment
has been financed in part by capital inflows, largely from recycled OPEC
surpluses, leading to an accumulation of foreign debt . The subsequent rise in
interest rates in the United States and the United Kingdom and the decline in
their export markets greatly increased the burden of this debt at the turn of
the decade, leading to widespread concern about the sustainability of these
debts.
There have been discussions of temporary liquidity instruments to aid
developing countries with large foreign debts. This measure would in a sense
substitute for transfers, reproducing at least temporarily the wealth effects to
be expected from North-South transfers. The shortage of liquidity in the world
economy is indeed one of the most important concerns of the international
business community at present, and one that is of the utmost importance to
major international financial institutions . However, it will be argued that the
effects of aid or of liquidity measures must be viewed within the larger context
of international markets . Their eventual impact on market prices may run
contrary to the expected effects of well-intentioned policies, unless
the
transfers are associated with productivity increases in certain sectors of the
Southern countries.
A MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
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This section is concerned with the recurrence and increasing severity of
recession in the OECD countries, and in particular with the role of the
two oil
price shocks of the 1970s.
It is conventional wisdom that oil price increases were the main factor in
initiating and then in perpetuating the recession in industrial economies : Both
Keynesians and monetarists have held oil prices responsible for the poor per-
formance of their economic recommendations. Keynesians attributed
to
higher oil prices the worsening trade-off between inflation and
unemploy-
ment, and the consequent failure ofdemand management to cope with stagfla-
tion . Monetarists have attributed to high oil prices the undue severity of the
recession that their policies produced in order to reduce inflation .
Whatever
the case, higher oil prices have certainly illuminated the disagreements
be-
tween the two schools, and have also called attention to their inadequacies .
The last few years have seen more disagreement and disarray in
macroeconomics than any other time in the postwar period .
Obviously the macro impact of oil prices is an issue that demands careful
attention . The claim that higher oil prices are largely responsible
for either
stagflation or recession in fact runs counter to most empirical evidence on the
macroeconomic impact of energy prices . This evidence suggest that higher
energy prices have been at most a major contributory factor to the economic
slowdown in industrial countries . Studies carried out on OECD data and
econometric models suggest that the effect of the 1973 oil price increase on
OECD GNP was a reduction of at most 2 percent, with an associated long-run
price increase of about 6 percent. The same study indicates that the 1979-80
price increase contributed less to the subsequent recession than did the
restric-
tive monetary policies implemented at that time .' These findings
are consis-
tent with those of a number of other studies carried out
independently at
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research institutions in the United States . 2 For example, fundamental changesin the economic performance of the United States are generally agreed to havebegun around 1968, five years before the first oil price shock . 3 Yet it is thesechanges, especially in investment and productivity growth, that are believed tounderlie the present recession in that country. Of course, momentum wasadded by the events of 1973 .
Another item of evidence running counter to the suggestion of a predomi-nant role for oil prices is the duration of the recession . It will clearly last tenyears beyond the initial shock, although oil prices in real terms have now fallenback very substantially from their peak . Indeed, the severity of the recession
has actually increased just as oil prices have declined sharply. Another point
against a really significant role for oil prices in causing the present recession isthat the total value of oil imports of OECD countries is a very small proportion
of GNP. For instance, in the United States they amounted in 1981 to less than2 percent of GNP.4 It is difficult to believe that a price rise in this input could
be singly responsible for the worst recession since the 1930s. The formal
econometric studies cited above have confirmed these arguments, suggesting
that only a small part of the change in the economic environment in the in-
dustrial countries can be attributed to energy price movements. The biggest
impact of energy price increases seems to have been to redistribute profits
from the nonenergy to the energy sectors, and so to alter the pattern of invest-
ment .'
There is general agreement that insofar as oil prices contributed to the
recession, they did so by the speed of their change, rather than by the level
reached in 1973 . Two decades of low and falling oil prices led to inefficient
patterns ofenergy use, to the development oftechnologies that were clearly us-
ing energy inappropriately given the long-run supply-demand balance, and to
inadequate investment in alternative energy sources. This made the oil-using
countries particularly vulnerable to a change in the relative price of energy, a
change that was made possible in part by the high and very inelastic levels of
demand in industrial countries in the early 1970s. In this view, the problem is
therefore that oil prices were too low for a long period, and that the error was
then corrected too rapidly.fi Experience since 1973 shows that the capacity of
the industrial economies to adjust their patterns of energy use in response to
changed relative factor prices is in fact very great. However, such adjustments
necessarily take a number of years and require that market prices provide the
correct incentives . For example, energy use per unit of GNP in the United
States has fallen by 38 percent over the last decade, something of a record in
terms of patterns of input changes.'
If neither energy price increases nor conventional macroeconomic theories
explain satisfactorily the development of the current situation, what are the
alternatives? We argue that important changes in industrial structure have
made the industrial economies more vulnerable to cumulative recessionary
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tendencies, and that these tendencies have been reinforced by inappropriate
domestic economic policies . In particular, we argue that the growth of scale
economies in production has made industrial nations less economically stable,
and that this instability has been worsened by restrictive monetary
policies .e
Although the increased importance of scale economies is generally
acknowledged, 9 there is little analysis of what caused their emergence. This
seems to be related to changes in technology and to the expansion of
markets
in the postwar period, through both economic growth and increased
interna-
tional trade. The unprecedented expansion of markets for OECD products in
the postwar period could sustain new technologies more effectively
if these
were oriented to large-scale production .
It has been recognized for some time that scale economies in production are
a major source ofproductivity growth . Indeed recognition oftheir beneficial
im-
pact can be traced back to Adam Smith, with his analysis ofthe relationship
bet-
ween efficiency, division of labor, and the extent of the market . However, it
seems that as well as these benefits, they have costs . They may make the
economy more sensitive to interest rates, more vulnerable to shocks, and reduce
its ability to adjust to a changing environment . The sensitivity to interest
rates
arises because increasing returns industries are typically capital-intensive,
and
because their profits rapidly turn negative as output levels drop . The
vulnerability to shocks arises because scale economies can magnify minor shocks
and lead to self-reinforcing cycles of expansion or contraction .
The explanation lies in an important difference between increasing and
diminishing returns . A drop in demand and output will raise productivity and
lower prices in the conventional case of diminishing returns . However, with
increasing returns it does the opposite . A drop in demand raises costs,
thus
forcing up prices and causing demand to drop even further, setting in
motion
a self-reinforcing downward cycle . On the other hand, an expansion
of de-
mand does the opposite : It raises productivity, lowers costs and prices,
and
stimulates further demand increases .
The argument takes its simplist form in the case of an individual
in-
dustry, but the argument is easily generalized to the whole economy.
With
scale economies in production, average costs ofproduction fall as
output levels
rise and, conversely, average costs rise as output falls . The reason
is that large-
scale production uses inputs more efficiently than small-scale . If, on the
other
hand, the classical assumption of diminishing returns holds in the
economy,
then the opposite is true : average unit costs will rise with output
and will fall
when output is cut back . There is now substantial evidence that
costs fall with
scale, in many important sectors.
In such a situation, consider an initial equilibrium that is disturbed
by the
loss of competitiveness on the part of one firm . A natural consequence
is that
this firm's market share falls, and its output contracts . Now, as
output con-
tracts, costs will rise because the economies of large scale are
reduced. Hence,
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the competitive position of this firm worsens further, causing a further drop in
output and a cycle of falling output and rising costs . By this mechanism, thena market equilibrium in an economy with falling costs is easily disturbed; adecline in one firm's position sets in motion forces that worsen the decline andmake it cumulative . However, under the classical assumption of diminishing
returns, just the opposite is true . A decline in a firm's competitive position, by
cutting back its output, leads to a fall in its costs and so restores some of thelost competitiveness . There are therefore forces making for the stability of theinitial equilibrium .
The above arguments show that a market equilibrium is readily disturbed
if there are economies of scale. A loss of competitiveness on the part of one
firm sets in motion forces that reinforce that loss . In fact, the argument is quite
symmetric : If one firms gains an advantage over its competitors-for exam-
ple, through an innovation-then by expanding its market this reduces the
firm's costs further and reinforces the original gain, enabling it to move fur-
ther ahead . There are thus tendencies that reinforce a lead and increase a lag:
If you get ahead of your competitors, you move further ahead, but if you get
behind, then you trail more and more .
Similar arguments can evidently be made at the level of the economy as a
whole. Of course, the analysis is a little more complex in this case, as the
economy will typically consist ofa number ofsectors, only some of which have
economies of large-scale production . However, it is generally the case that
goods produced with economies of scale-consumer electronics and consumer
durables, for example-are leading sectors and are an important part of the
market . They also face demands that are highly income-elastic, while the
diminishing returns goods face demands with lower income elasticities .
Therefore an economic expansion will shift the pattern of demand toward the
increasing return industries . Their costs and prices fall, leading to a further
expansion of their demands, and a cycle of self-reinforcing growth may
develop.
Equally, a self-reinforcing contraction may occur in response to a change
in demand that decreases demand in the increasing returns to scale sector .
This could for instance be caused by restrictive monetary policies . So at the
aggregate macroeconomic level, expansion, whether due to domestic policies
or to gains in overseas markets, becomes self-reinforcing . Equally, contraction
due either to restrictive domestic policies, or to loss of markets to foreign com-
petitors, can become cumulative . The main self-correcting responses of mar-
kets with diminishing returns have been removed. The macroeconomic conse-
quences are discussed below. Briefly, this makes the economy particularly
vulnerable to a combination of stagnation and inflation and decreases the ef-
fectiveness of traditional antiinflationary policies . The important point is that
if the economy is on a contractional path, then average productivity falls in the
increasing returns sector, thus raising its costs . On the other hand, recession
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will lower factor prices, especially real wages, tending to
lower costs. The net
impact of deflation on the price level
will depend on the balance between these
two effects . The most likely outcome is that extremely
severe deflation will be
needed to reach price stability, though the outcome could
also be a combina-
t i on of inflation and recession.
Conversely, if the economy is expanding, then average costs fall and
there is a downward movement of prices . So the outcome is now
growth with
	
.
price stability . The crucial point here is that with economies
of scale a contrac-
tion, by making production less efficient, can generate
an upward pressure on
costs and so begin an inflationary process. Expansion, however,
tends natural-
ly to reduce costs.
The policy implications of this analysis are quite immediate and are en-
tirely consistent with recommendations already made by
the United Nations
for rather different reasons.'° Inflationary pressures
due to cost increases aris-
ing from a recession cannot readily be cured by traditional
deflationary
policies . These policies, by reducing output further and so lowering
efficiency
and raising costs in the increasing returns sector, in fact defeat
some of their
original purpose . Traditional deflationary policies will therefore incur
all of
the usual social costs of unemployment and wasted
resources but may be of
less value than expected in reducing inflation .
In fact, there are reasons to suppose that the social costs of deflation may
be particularly high in industries with economies of scale. The
reason is that
deflation is associated with high interest rates . In this case, industries with
in-
creasing returns will not contract continuously as demand falls, but
will at
some stage shut down, throwing large numbers of workers onto
the labor
market ." The only way of preventing this is to administer subsidies to keep
them in operation . Such situations have clearly arisen in many
OECD coun-
tries in such industries as steel, automobiles, coal, and others .
There is another conventional argument for deflation that is also invalid
in this context, which relates to the supposed efficiency gains from
increasing
the competitive pressures under which an economy operates . The
theory is
that the resulting "shake-out" eliminates inefficiency, so that in
the long run
the competitive position of the economy is strenghtened . Again, it is clear
that
while there may be some efficiency gains from such a process, there
will also
be efficiency losses from the smaller scale of operation, as economies
of large
scale are foregone . The rationale for restrictive policies as a
response to
stagflation is thus very weak indeed in modern economies with large-scale
technologies . Not only are the social costs in terms of unemployment
very
high, but such policies are of little value in reducing prices or raising
efficiency
in important sectors of the economy. If deflation is pursued by
restrictive
monetary policies, then the resultant high interest rates may lead to
bankrupt-
cies among the capital-intensive sectors of the economy, unless these
are-
subsidized .
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There is a positive side to this analysis, which is just the converse of the
above. Appropriate expansionary policies, focused on increasing returns to
scale sectors, will not only raise output and employment but may also reduce
inflationary pressures generated by high average costs. Such policies need,
however, to be oriented toward increased output in industries where there are
scale economies, that is, typically to high-technology and mass-production in-
dustries . What is called for is selective and balanced expansion of supply and
demand-for example, with tax incentives for the extra expenditure to be
directed toward particular industries .
A general expansion ofdemand would meet these criteria only if increas-
ing returns goods had higher income elasticities of demand than others .
Usually one would need to steer the extra expenditures toward appropriate
sectors, using differential rates of sales tax by sector, or choosing to expand by
monetary rather than fiscal policies if the activity in increasing returns sectors
were highly sensitive to interest rates. In practice, the sectors with the most
scope for cost reduction via output expansion appear to be manufacturers of
electric and electronic equipment, manufacturers of chemicals and allied pro-
ducts, and transportation and communication."
PROTECTIONISM AND MANAGEDTRADE
The recent recession in the industrial countries has been the worst since
the Great Depression of the 1930s, In response to unemployment and the
decline in competitiveness of traditional industries, industrial countries have
sought to protect these industries from international competition . Only in a
relatively few cases has this taken the form of explicit tariffs or quotas . '3 More
often, there have been informal agreements to restrict competition-for exam-
ple, informal limits on the number ofJapanese cars imported into the United
Kingdom and the suggested harmonization of the prices of food exports from
Europe and the United States . These are sometimes referred to as "orderly
marketing arrangements" and are justified as ways of ensuring "fair competi-
tion . "
In many cases these concerns do little more than give a veneer of respec-
tability to a traditional protectionist lobby . However, this should not obscure
the substantive issues at stake here . A general analytical content can be given
to these issues of fair or unfair competition andoforderly trade . But before go-
ing any further we should note that trade policies have many aspects and can-
not be measured by a single number describing more or less liberalization ."
Different sectors mayjustify very different trade policies, and a country with a
small number of substantial but carefully selected trade restrictions may in fact
integrate with the international economic system better than one with a
uniformly low level of restrictions or with none at all.
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We shall therefore differentiate sharply between managed trade and pro-
tectionism, the first being a more constructive trade policy . We shall focus on
the implications of managed trade for economies with increasing returns and
show that while protectionism prevents specialization, managed trade may in
some cases encourage it .
However, we shall also distinguish the desirability of international
specialization under different circumstances, taking into account not just the ,
supply efficiency but also the demand patterns generated . Because of disloca
tions in supply and demand, specialization may lead to persistent trade im-
balances, and in some cases to welfare losses . It is simply not true that efficient
operation of a world economy with increasing returns means a return to a
North-South division of labor where the North specializes in capital-intensive
and the South in labor-intensive production . We shall argue that this
somewhat dated vision can lead only to persistent trade imbalances and in-
crease the costs of adjustments to the evolving international economy . In so
doing, we explore the extent to which exports of labor-intensive products help
or inhibit the development of increasing return sectors within the South.
Finally, we consider the issue of structural change in modern industrial_
economies and relate this to economies of scale and the need for managed
trade.
We shall now turn to the issues of orderly trade and fair competition .
There is obviously some confusion in the use of the term "unfair
competition ." It is typically used to refer to low prices of imports that compete
with domestic production," with a clear implication that low import prices
represent a problem. Yet in the case of extractive resources, the problem is
widely seen as one of import prices being too high .', It is not a priori im-
mediately clear why in the case of some imports high prices constitute a prob-
lem, while in the case of others it is low prices that constitute a problem. Cer-
tainly onecannot justify this distinction on the grounds that whereasJapanese
cars compete with domestic production, OPEC oil does not-for both in the
United Kingdom and the United States, oil imports compete with domestic
production, and in all industrial countries they compete with domestic coal
production . Indeed, through the process offactor substitution, oil imports also
compete with domestic capital and labor. Low oil prices lead to more oil-
intensive technologies, which use less domestic capital and labor than other-
wise .
It is clear, then, that we cannot extract an implicit definition of unfair
pricing from current usage, though we note for the record that the fact that im-
port prices may apparently be "too high" or "too low" does suggest that
there may be an intermediate optimal range. This is an issue that we shall
return to in our discussion of resource pricing. Overall, it is evident that fair
competition and orderly trade cannot be characterized only by the level of im-
port prices, but that they must be related to whether the trade and pricing
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patterns are in some sense conducive to macroeconomic efficiency . We turnnext to this issue .
A useful way ofapproaching this is to consider the impact ofeconomies ofscale on patterns of trade and on the distribution of gains from trade. Tradi-tional trade theory assumes constant or diminishing returns to scale in produc-tion, and this denies the possibility that large-scale production may be moreefficient than small-scale . In fact, large-scale production clearly is more effi-cient in many fields that are important in international trade : automobiles,
computers, and steel provide obvious examples . In each case there are reasons
why large-scale producers may be more efficient than small. These may bepure technological, as in the case of steel, or they may derive from the high
fixed costs of research and development, as in the case of computers, or theymay be partly managerial and organizational, as with automobiles . In any
event, neoclassical trade theory assumes away all such effects, and this is a
crucial step in its ability to derive the well-known propositions about gainsfrom trade and the distortionary effects of tariffs and quotas . However,
resuming away scale economies in production limits considerably the ap-,
plicability of this theory .
If one admits these more general cases of returns to scale, the usual con-
clusions about the gains from unrestricted trade must be heavily qualified . In
particular, a concept of "orderly trade" emerges naturally, as there are condi-
tions under which active management of trade flows is needed to ensure that
all countries gain . Without such management, all of the gains from trade may
accrue to just one trading partner, with the others possibly being net losers .
This active management of trade flows typically involves carefully coordinated
limits on imports or exports . This provides a framework within which one can
evaluate alternative trade policies and find some analytical equivalents to such
phrases as "undue market penetration" or "unfair competition.""
What happens is that with scale economies in production, there may be
no prices at which all partners gain from trade and at which trade also
balances, even if prices are fully flexible and markets perfectly competitive .
Scale economies in production imply that price adjustments maynot be able to
balance supply and demand . 18 The conclusion is that if there exist prices at
which both trading countries can gain, we may need a "visible hand" to en-
sure that trade will also balance.
This argument bears a little elaboration . Consider two countries and two
produced goods, each of which is manufactured under conditions of
economies of scale. Then each country produces most efficiently by specializ-
ing in one good and meeting its needs for the other by trade . If each country
were to produce all of its requirements of both products, this would lead to
smaller-scale and less-efficient production . Productive efficiency thus seems to
imply specialization and trade, with each country exporting the good in which
it specializes and importing the other. However, this neglects important
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economic issues . The supply provided by industries with economies of scale
cannot always vary as smoothly as demand in response to price changes . Firms
will instead switch from large- to small-scale production abruptly as prices
change, and this maymake it impossible to get precisely the outputs needed to
meet demand . The market will shift abruptly from excess demand to excess
supply, with no intermediate market clearing position, or will remain at a
point of market disequilibrium . 19 An example of this is given by the trading
relationships between Japan and the United States . This is characterized by a
persistent excess supply from Japan in an increasing returns to scale sector,
namely of production . Another instance would be the excess demand for in-
dustrial goods that are exported from industrial to developing countries and
produced under increasing returns. A measure of this excess demand would
be the persistent balance-of-payments deficits of the importers.
We have now explained the need for the management oftrade in econom-
ies with increasing returns. The next step is to show how this differs from pro-
tectionism, and what managed trade means in a North-South context.
The first step is easier . Protectionism is designed specifically to prevent
specialization that would naturally occur as a result of market forces . An ex-
ample is the multifiber agreement, which seeks to reverse the trend toward the
specialization of the industry in developing countries that presumably offer
better prices and products . This agreement attempts to prevent specialization .
Less explicit policies of this sort exist in other industries such as steel and
various light manufactures .
In contrast, managed trade would seek to promote overall efficiency,
which in certain cases may require more rather than less specialization, and an
appropriate industrial policy to phase out obsolete parts of the industry . An
example, is the European policy toward steel, where appropriate incentives
are offered to ease the phasing out ofplants in sectors of the industry that have
a large minimum efficient scale of operation and cannot compete with Taiwan
or Korea, while encouraging instead the production of more specialist pro-
ducts. This shows clearly the difference between managed trade and protec-
tionism . It also illustrates the fact that managed trade policies cannot be for-
mulated in isolation from other industrial policies . Indeed, the management of
trade should be seen as an extension of industrial policy to the international
arena.
We now tackle the issue of managed trade in a North-South context . The
statements made so far about the desirability of specialization with increasing
returns are not necessarily applicable to North-South trade. Even if specializa
tion could be managed so as to prevent trade imbalances, a fundamental asym-
metry between the traders may render our previous arguments inapplicable .
In North-South trade we often see an increasing returns product being traded for
a decreasing returns product. A typical example is the trade of industrial goods,
which are often produced under increasing returns, for labor intensive
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manufacturers or primary products . Because of this fundamental asymmetry
the management of trade may take a quite different form, and indeed mayrecommend against many forms of specialization in North-South trade. We
shall discuss this next .
A higher trade volume increases the efficiency of the exporter with increas-ing returns and the productivity of its labor, thus leading to domestic gains fromexports. At the international level, this exporter will also gain if the highervolume of trade brings it higher revenues . Whether or not this will happendepends, of course, on the relative prices of the two goods traded .
We may think a priori that the prices of the increasing returns product willfall, and those of the decreasing returns products rise, with the expansion oftrade . This would lead to an improvement in terms of trade of the South.
However, quite the opposite may happen .
It has been established that the terms of trade of a region exporting a
decreasing or constant return to scale product will worsen as exports expand,
iflabor is very abundant and its technologies dualistic. This point is developed
in detail in the next section. This drop in prices as exports expand can be
mistakenly attributed to lower costs due to increasing returns but is in fact a
rather different phenomenon . What causes the drop in prices is not higher pro-
ductivity, but rather lower output and lower wages in the South. An expan-
sion of exports from the South may be possible only with a reduction in
domestic output, which causes in turn a severe restriction of domestic con-
sumption and makes more surplus available to the international market .
As a matter of fact, Arthur Lewis's model of development '0 will also
predict that trade expansion will cause a drop in the South's terms of trade, in
a situation where the North trades an increasing returns good for a decreasing
returns product from the South . He determines the relative prices of the
traded products by the factorial terms of trade, which is the ratio of labor pro-
ductivity in the two regions. Increased trade in these circumstances always im-
proves the North's factorial terms of trade, because it improves its relative
productivity .
Under these circumstances, nothing could be more inefficient for the
South than specializing further in labor-intensive exports . Any form of
managed trade that seeks overall efficiency will advise against specialization in
such cases . It should be noted that when technologies are more homogeneous
or labor more skilled and less abundant, specialization no longer has the
negative impacts described above. This illustrates once again the importance
of the coordination of domestic and international policies and exhibits rather
strikingly how an optimal management of trade will depend on the
characteristics of the trading regions.
Having discussed the issue of managed trade, and its implications in a
North-South context, we now turn to our final topic in this section: the dif-
ficulties in structural adjustment in modern industrial economies. It has
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already been noted that such difficulties are at the root of many current
n,acroeconomic problems . The connection between trade imbalance and in-
adequate structural flexibility is that both stem in part from economies of scale
in production . With scale economies,
it is only when operating at high output
levels that a firm is efficient and productive . In this case, it becomes impossi-
ble to ensure the gradual contraction of declining industries and the
gradual
expansion of their successors .
The difficulty arises because productivity increases with the scale of opera-
t ion. This means that once an industry is uncompetitive and unprofitable, any
contraction will reduce its productivity and make its position deteriorate further.
But contraction is a natural consequence of an uncompetitive position, so that
there is a vicious circle ofdecline here . Loss ofcompetitive position lead: ; to con-
traction, which leads to further loss of competitive position, and so or .
Only
through expansion could the firm break out of this cycle, but expansion is em-
phatically not a natural consequence of loss of competitiveness . This requires
some "visible hand" encouragement to the market forces because of the risks
involved and the public good aspects of the problem.21
This should be contrasted with the traditional case of diminishing returns
and diseconomies of large-scale operations . In this case, productivity arises as
output is cut back, and as the diseconomies of large scale are avoided . An un-
competitive industry will naturally reduce its scale and thereby raise its pro-
ductivity and restore its competitive position . A loss of competitiveness
therefore sets in motion forces that tend to compensate for this, and to restore
the original position, rather than forces that lead to cumulative decline. In the
one case with diminishing returns, industrial structures have a degree of
in-
herent stability and will change smoothly . In the other case with
increasing
returns, they may be innately unstable and respond erratically to changes in
the economic environment .
It emerges, then, that problems of persistent trade imbalance of struc-
tural adjustment are both related in their origins to changes in technology
that
have led to the greater competitive efficiency of a large-scale
organization .
The analysis of these issues provides another approach to the issues of "fair
competition" and "orderly trade." These can now be seen as trade patterns
that are conducive to trade balance and to patterns and rates
of
macroeconomic structural change that minimize social costs . These patterns
will typically not be those that emerge from market forces but will require con-
scious selection via intervention .
There are thus two approaches to the concept of orderly trade, one in
terms of import prices that lie within a certain range, and the other in terms of
trade balance and structural adaptation . These approaches complement each
other .
The ultimate conclusion from this analysis is that one cannot recom-
mend, as an objective of international policy, a return to the pursuit of a trade
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regime as uniformly liberal as possible . With increasing returns, the invisible
hand cannot ensure harmonious and efficient outcomes . The need is for in-
stitutions to establish trade regulations and patterns that are consistent withtrade balance and with the smooth occurrence of any necessary structural
changes. 22 This will of course involve relating international economic policies
to domestic economic structures . More concretely, for developing countries itmust mean a limit on export prospects for many of their products . This is
elaborated further in the following sections .
EXPORT-LED STRATEGIES BASED ON
TRADITIONAL COMMODITIES
The last 15 years have seen an increasing emphasis on export-led
development strategies . Indeed, such strategies have become an automatic
policy recommendation by international organizations . Increases in exports
are appealing for alleviating short-term balance-of-payments deficits or
foreign exchange constraints . However, the current economic climate in the
industrial countries, which are the principal importers, does not seem pro-
pitious for a substantial expansion of exports of traditional commodities.2'
Even if it were possible, such an expansion would require a sizable drop in ex-
port prices, that is, in the South's terms of trade.
The economic support for export-led strategies is usually derived from a
particular view ofthe international division of labor and ofwhat constitutes an
"engine of growth" for a developing country. A more general and perhaps
more realistic view is to evaluate export-led growth strategies by analyzing the
circumstances in which these strategies can be expected to succeed and those
where they cannot . In the latter case alternative policies should be considered,
taking into account not only narrow forms of import substitution but also
more broadly based development strategies as well as the possibility of exports
of less traditional products .
Over the last 30 years a consistent body of theory has been developed to
analyze the effects of trade on the trading economies. This theory has two
main pillars : the ideas centered on gains from trade and those based on factor
price equilization . These have been generalized, expanded, and applied very
widely, so that their conclusions have reached the noneconomist and acquired
the status of common and undisputed knowledge. They are used often to
substantiate claims that more trade is better for all, especially when it utilizes
the relative advantages of each trading region .s'
Neoclassical trade theory is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model and is
usually presented in the framework of two regions trading with each other in
two products . Each region uses two factors of production, labor and capital ;
one good is more labor-intensive and the other more capital-intensive . The
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tw o countries are identical in all respects except for a difference in their factor
endowments, which leads to different product and factor prices in each region .
In isolation, that is, prior to trade, the labor-intensive product in the labor-
abundant country has a lower price than the same product in the other coun-
try . Wages and prices are also different in the two regions. In particular, in
isolation, the rewards of labor (wages) are lower in the country with more
labor . When international trade in commodities takes place the prices of com-
modities are equalized in the two regions . Each region exports the commodity
that is produced with its most abundant factor . Higher levels ofwelfare are at-
tained by both countries because each may consume more by specializing in
the exports of the good in which it has a relative advantage, while importing
the good in which the other has an advantage.
A further result links the gains from trade with the equalization of factor
prices . Following the equalization of commodity prices in the international
market, the factor prices (of labor and capital) in the two regions will also
equalize . Therefore, free trade leads to a rise in the real wage in the labor-
abundant country. The specialization in the production of the labor-intensive
good, which is a form of international division of labor, would therefore improve _
the distribution of income within the South. Moreover, as wages in the South
increase, the relative advantage of the South decreases, so that this theory
predicts that relative advantages tend to disappear with continued trade . The
factors that lead to the international division of labor are eliminated with time .
The appeal of gains from trade and factor price equalization results has
been powerful enough to shape almost all formalized thinking on the theory of
trade and international economic relations over the last 30 years, and to
permeate policy thinking in a pervasive manner . However, it is becoming in-
creasingly clear that there are several important factors that have not been
considered in these theories .
It is generally acknowledged that the Heckscher-Ohlin model has not pro-
vided an adequate explanation for salient features of the postwar period
(1945-70). In this period, the volume of international trade increased in an
historically unprecedented fashion, while wealth differentials and the division
of labor between North and South became more pronounced . Furthermore, it
is generally acknowledged that the distribution of income within the South did
not improve during this period . Neither gains from trade nor factor price
equalization theories seem consistent with these facts." As Arthur Lewis has
recently observed, "the market works to concentrate rather than to diffuse the
benefits of trade.1116 Of course, exogenous historical explanations could be in-
voked but this would amount to an implicit recognition of the limited ex-
planatory powers of the theory .
An alternative theory can be offered, taking into account features of
North-South trade that are lacking in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Our North-
South model is consistent with perfectly competitive markets throughout,
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but it allows for differences in the economic structures between the trading
regions.21 If these differences are small, one obtains results in the spirit of
Heckscher-Ohlin . However, if the economic structures are significantly dif-
ferent, one can describe precisely when the expansion of trade is beneficial to
the South and when it is not.
The structural differences in the two regions are of two types:
" Differences in technologies, in particular, the degree of technological diversity be-
tween traditional and industrial sectors in the South, should be much larger
than in the North.
" Differences in the labor market behavior: Labor supply in the South should be highly
responsive to changes in real wages (due, for example, to a significant migration
from the subsistence to the industrial sectors of the economy) while labor supply
in the North is less responsive to changes in the real wage .
These two structural differences, taken together, or indeed just the
greater dualism of technologies in the South together with an assumption that
all wages are spent on the basic good, lead to important general equilibrium
effects called "income effects." It is analytically convenient to divide the im-
pact of an export price change into price (or substitution) and income effects.
The price effects produce conventional demand responses, giving lower de-
mands at higher prices . The income effects of a price change describe the im-
pact that it has on demand via changes in income levels . An increase in prices
may lead to higher incomes and thus to increased rather than decreased de-
mand .28 The overall consequences of a price change for demand therefore de-
pend on the relative magnitudes of these two different effects . Technological
dualism, together with either abundant labor or wage income spent entirely on
the basic good, tends to emphasize income effects . Hence in either of these
cases the income effects of a price change dominate the price effects . From
now on we will refer for convenience largely to the case of technological
dualism and abundant labor in the South, but it should be recalled that the
arguments and conclusions apply equally well to the case of duality and wages
spent entirely on the basic good, quite independently of the abundance of
labor in the South.
Because of income effects, with dual technologies and abundant labor, an
increase in the exports of the labor-intensive basic consumption good will
result in a decrease in the price of this good in relation to that ofthe importable
good . Domestic employment and the purchasing power of wages also
decrease, so that domestic consumption of basic goods decreases. These effects
occur for any increase in exports, quite independently of the cause of this in-
crease . For example, the increase in the volume of exports of basic goods from
the South may follow an industrial expansion of the North, and yet the same
negative results obtain . These results do not depend, therefore, on any
assumptions on the elasticity of international demand for goods from the
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South but rather on domestic conditions in the South.29 A very clear non-
technical summary of the arguments that support this conclusion was given by
K. J . Arrow:
Very loosely, the argument is the following. Suppose the rise in export de-
mand for the B commodity were followed by an increase in its price . Since
its production is highly labor-intensive, there should be a rise in real wages
and, since labor supply is highly responsive to the real wage, a con-
siderable increase in labor supply . The rise in both real wage and labor
supply increases even more rapidly the domestic demand for the B com-
modity, since it is all directed to the B commodity. Hence supply available
for export would decrease, and therefore would not match the increased de-
mand for exports . It follows that the only way the export demand could be
met, under these conditions, would be a decrease in the price ofcommodity
B and of real wages.'°
This argument emphasizes the importance of income effects:" An increase
in the price of the basic good leads to increases in both employment and real
wages, and thus to an increase in total income and in demand . Although this
quote refers to the case of dualism and abundant labor, the same argument ap-
plies with dualism alone if all wage income is spent on the B commodity. In
such cases, an increase in export demand can be met only by a decrease in both
real wages and the price of the basic good . This is because only at lower real
wages will domestic consumption allow increased exports, and lower real
wages are associated with a lower price of the labor-intensive basic good .
Under the conditions of technological dualism and of abundant labor in the
South, a higher volume of exports is necessarily associated with a lower price
of a basic good, with lower wages and employment, and with lower domestic
consumption of basic goods .
It seems worth pointing out that these results are reversed when the produc-
tion system in the South is more homogeneous and when its labor supply is
less responsive to real wages. In this latter case, an expansion of exports leads
to an improvement in the North-South terms of trade, and also to increases in
domestic employment, consumption, and real wages. From an economic
viewpoint, therefore, the economic parameters of dualism and labor abun-
dance must be considered and, if necessary, modified before embarking on an
export-led policy .
It is of interest that the international division of labor tends to be reinforced
by the expansion of international trade when technologies are different across
sectors, and when labor is abundant in the South . This is because in this case
an increase in exports lowers wages in the South, therefore reinforcing its
relative advantage . Relative advantage here derives from low wages, which
imply low labor costs . This is of course different from the relative advantage
derived from the lower labor costs that obtain when labor is very productive,
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so that total labor costs are low, even though individual wages may be high . Incontrast to the predictions of the neoclassical-model that the international divi-
sion of labor will gradually disappear, inequality and the international division
of labor may perpetuate themselves in this case, despite the assumption ofperfectly competitive markets. This difference in results emerges because the
neoclassical models do not consider abundant labor and dual technologies .
A further point is that factor prices not only fail to equalize across regions
in this model but also tend to drift further apart within the South as trade ex-
pands. The rewards to capital increase, and the rewards to labor decrease .
This point is worth emphasizing because it is only natural that in a
neoclassical model with different technologies in the two regions, the prices of
factors will not be the same in both regions. However, under the neoclassical
assumptions, factor prices in the South will move toward those of the North as
the countries move from autarchy to free trade, leading to an increase in
wages in the South . It has been inferred from this that an increase in trade will
improve the distribution of income in the South, though this inference certainly
does not follow without additional assumption . In the case of abundant labor
and dual technologies, however, it is clearly established that an increase in the
volume of trade will worsen the distribution of income in the South. Our
results compare factor rewards at different levels of trade, while the
neoclassical results compare only autarchy and free trade .
It has already been indicated that we refer to two distinct but related
cases, namely where the South is characterized by dualism and abundant
labor, and where it is dualistic and exports a "wage good"-that is, all wage
income is spent on this good . Examples would be exports of agricultural or
manufactured products that are consumed domestically from wage income,
such as meat or meat by-products in Argentina, jute and textiles in India and
Pakistan, or rice in Thailand . This analysis can in fact be extended to a third
case, which represents a considerable generalization of these: the case where
the region exports a labor-intensive product that is produced almost exclusive-
ly for export . . Examples are coffee and soya beans in Brazil, bananas in
Central America, and tea in Sri Lanka. In this latter case, we consider three
rather than two sectors in the South-industrial good, basic goods, and the
labor-intensive export . This export is called an "enclave" because it is not
consumed domestically nor is it used as an input to production in other
domestic industries . The results show that with abundant labor and dual
technologies, an increase in exports ofthe enclave leads to lower terms of trade
and to a decrease in the domestic consumption ofbasic goods. This can also be
traced to income effects, but of a different nature, since the enclave good is not
consumed domestically . It results from the competition between the enclave
and the basic good sectors in factor markets. Both are labor-intensive sectors .
An increase in wages leads to higher demand for basic goods. This leads, in
turn, to more employment in the basic sector, and even though total labor
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supply increases, less labor is employed in the enclave. Higher wages lead to
lower exports in such circumstances, so that a drop in wages is required to in-
crease exports ."
Domestic consumption of basic goods therefore decreases while exports
increase . This appears to be consistent with an observation made by A. K.
Sen and other authors, who note that a region with decreased food consump-
tion, or even famines, may be sustaining or even increasing its level of food
supplies or food exports." Food consumption in a region is a result of com-
plex market forces, rather than a simple relation between food supplies and
populations .
Finally, we consider cases where the export commodity is a resource that
is extracted almost exclusively for sale in the international market but is not
labor-intensive . Examples are minerals such as copper in Chile and oil in
Venezuela. The results also show a connection between the success of export-
led policies and the characteristics of demand and technologies, and are
described in the section on "Resources and North-South Trade."
The results discussed above pose doubts about general reliance on export-
led growth for bringing about equality and development in the South." When
labor is very abundant and there is a significant level of duality in production,
export-led growth cannot be expected to bring about gains from trade nor to
improve consumption and real wages in the South . A careful appraisal ofeach
case, focused especially on the parameters studied here (labor markets,
technologies, and structure of demand) seems in order before endorsing
export-led strategies . Alternative strategies are preferable until the underlying
conditions on technologies and labor markets can be improved .
In general terms it can be said that the growth ofthe South should not be
based on the relative advantage of cheap labor associated with poverty . To the
extent that widespread poverty is consistent with abundant labor supply, and
leads to technologies in the industrial sector very different from those in the
rest of the economy, export-led policies may lead to a deterioration of the in-
ternational terms of trade of the South, lower wages, and also lower export
revenues . Even though in the short run the revenues accruing to a small elite
could be increased, in the medium and long runs the country as a whole is
worse off. This possibility has been substantiated by econometric studies of
trade between selected industrial and developing countries."
A short discussion ofpossible ways of remedying this situation, and of the
conditions necessary to reap the benefits from export-led growth, seems in
order. A first requirement would be the development of stronger domestic
markets and in general of policies conducive to a better distribution of income .
Such policies would lead to lower rates of population growth and to a lower
response of labor supplies to higher wages. If accompanied by the use of more
homogeneous technologies, then there could be gains from increased trade in
labor-intensive products .
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The main point is that increasing the productivity of labor, and develop-
ing stronger domestic markets, permits a stronger "bargaining position" ininternational markets. The protection of local production, that is, importsubstitution and infant industry protection, is neither a necessary nor a suffi-
cient correction per se, as it deals only with the supply side of the market and
neglects' demand factors . What is required is an appreciation of the two sides
of the market, both demand and supply, and a realization that local popula,
tions count in both sides ofthe profit equation, that is, as customers as well asinputs . Domestic markets must be strong in order to prevent deterioration of
international terms of trade and the accompanying accumulation of balance-
of-payments deficits . This requires the development of the domestic market as
a whole, so that increases in the productivity of rural or other low-income
groups seem necessary before embarking on export-led policies .
Examples ofsuccessful export-led policies in the last 20 years, which were
widely discussed in the 1970s, include Japan, Germany, and South Korea. In
all these cases the domestic markets were relatively strong, and the levels of
productivity, employment, wages, and consumption were relatively high .
Less successful export-led policies have been pursued by Latin American
countries, which have dual economies and more "abundant" labor. The
results indicate a significant relationship between the North-South terms of
trade and the distribution of income within the South. Better terms of trade
with the North are associated with a better distribution of income in the South .
The international market is therefore an important factor in shaping domestic
distributions within each region . Its impact depends on the prevailing market
and technological conditions . The interaction of domestic and international
factors should therefore not be neglected, even with respect to variables that
are usually considered purely domestic, such as the distribution of income .
ARMAMENTS ANDNORTH-SOUTH TRADE
Armament flows have come to play an increasingly important role in in-
ternational markets, and North-South trade has become the most important
element of this growing sector . The mah . exporters are in the North: The
United States, France, and the United Kingdom jointly have accounted for at
least 60 percent by value of all arms exports since World War II . In particular,
between 1965 and 1974 the United States alone delivered just under 50 per-
cent of all arms traded in the international market, and the USSR followed
with 28 percent .16
The last 15 years have seen the armaments trade shift dramatically from a
within-North to a North-South trade . From 1950 to 1965 arms trade within
the North amounted to $13.1 billion," while the South purchased arms to the
value of $6.31 billion . From 1965 to 1974, however, foreign and military sales
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orders (FMSO) from the North amounted to $8.99 billion, while those from
the South amounted to $27 .63 billion (all in constant 1970 prices). This im-
plies that North-South arms trade rose by over 450 percent between these two
periods, while within-North arms trade fell by about 30 percent . This means
that currently approximately
three-quarters of global arms trade is North-
South. Over the same period 1950-74, the total volume of world trade rose by
240 percent. Therefore, during this period, North-South arms trade almost
doubled its share of total world trade .
Note that trade in armaments is only a part of all arms transfers: The total
includes military grants and aid, military assistance programs, and military
transfers against special credit arrangements . These nonmarket transfers are of
course difficult to value and have decreased
dramatically in importance, from
being 800 percent of market transfers during the period 1950-65 to only 25 per-
cent of these during 1965-74. Arms flows are therefore increasingly being trans-
acted through the market, rather than being part of a political process .
As most arms are purchased by the South, and approximately 80 percent of
the South's exports are primary commodities, it is reasonable to expect a connec-
tion between arms imports andcommodity prices and exports. In fact, in substan-
tial measure North-South trade can be characterized as a trade of raw materials
and minerals for capital goods and arms . There is a very strong correlation be-
tween arms imports and military expenditures in the South and the prices of the
South's commodity exports." To be precise, a study of the export of nine com-
modities (aluminum, cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton, rice, rubber, steel, and sugar)
exported by 37 countries found strong correlations between commodity export
prices and arms imports. Because their elasticities of demand are less than one,
commodity prices are positively related to export revenues . The total export
revenues of primary producers are therefore also positively correlated with arms
imports. As an example, in the period 1972 to 1974, the U.S . oil bill rose by a fac-
tor of 5.6 ($6.4/$0.8 billion), while FMSOsto OPEC countries increased by a fac-
tor of 7.51 ($6.4/$0.8 billion), and represented in 1974 roughly 25 percent of the
U.S . oil import bill . This implies, at least for the United States, an elasticity of
military sales with respect to oil imports in excess of unity.
Given present trade patterns, policies that raise the export revenues of
primary producers will therefore lead to increases in the North-South arms
trade. Higher export revenues will be partly recycled through the purchase of
these arms . The precise extent to which this occurs of course varies by com-
modity and by country: In some cases it is substantial enough to suggest that
domestic populations will enjoy only small welfare gains as a result of relaxa-
tion of foreign exchange constraints following higher export revenues .
NORTH-SOUTH TRANSFERS AND FINANCIAL POLICIES
For the last 20 years, the issue ofaid and transfers has been widely discussed
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as a means of narrowing the North-South wealth gap. As early as 1961, the in-dustrial market economies agreed in principle to target 1 percent of their GNPto poor nations, with 0 .7 percent in the form of Official Development
Assistance, that is, concessional transfers from or guaranteed by governments,,
The matter received widespread attention, it became a permanent feature ofNorth-South dialogues, and most economic models of North-South relations
saw it as the single most important policy tool for narrowing the wealth gap.4o
However, in recent years the issue of North-South transfers has lost some of itsappeal . It is becoming increasingly clear that North-South aid flows have
followed a downward trend . They never reached even 30 percent ofthe stated
goals, and in recent years have decreased significantly in absolute as well as in
relative terms," except for the OPEC countries' contributions.12
In the current economic recession, industrial countries do not even wish
to consider the matter of transfers, and the issue has effectively been dropped
from the North-South agenda . Contributions to development assistance pro-
grams have also followed a decreasing trend.4a
Recently the international business community has been concerned with
the substantial foreign debt accumulated by some developing countries, a sig-
nificant part of which is outstanding loans from private institutions in indus
trial countries. 44 These loans represented in part a recycling of OPEC
revenues, which were deposited in the commercial banks of industrial
nations.45 The severity of the recession in the industrial countries, coupled
with the availability of OPEC funds, moved a number of these banks to un-
dertake large loans to developing countries. These countries kept overall
higher investment and growth rates than the industrial countries, adding some
impetus to the world economy . 46 The enterprising spirit of capitalism there-
fore provided a measure of liquidity that was much needed at a time when the
governments of industrial countries would not provide an equivalent .
However, in the four years to 1980, interest rates in the United States
and the United Kingdom increased threefold as a consequence of the restric-
tive monetary policies . These were in part a response to oil price increases.
As the United States and the United Kingdom are the home bases of many of
the commercial banks, the burden of debt increased very significantly for
many LDCs, for example, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil . To illustrate the
orders of magnitude involved, with a $300 billion debt, a one point increase
in interest rates represents $3 billion extra repayments or additions to the
debt . A twelve point rise from 6 to 18 percent therefore represents a threefold
increase in the costs of debt servicing, from $18 billion to $54 billion per year,
giving demands on the balance of payments of $36 billion per year .4' The
change in domestic monetary policies in major industrial countries therefore
seriously undermined the ability of borrowing nations to service existing
debts .
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The picture so far is rather negative, but it must be recognized that the
impact of monetarism in the United States and the United Kingdom was very
profound and may have set in motion short- and long-term changes in the in-
ternational financial system, some of which we have already been able to
observe . The recent 47 percent increase in IMF quotas is a rather striking ex-
ample. The Inter-American Development Bank has also recently voted to
in-
crease its loans by 30 percent .
Effects that are more indirect, but not less striking, are also being felt at
present . The very enterprising nature of the industrial countries' banking
systems provided a check to the monetarist experiments in the United States
and the United Kingdom, as their exposure led them to press for lower interest
rates . The private banking system, an important bastion of capitalism,
became rather vulnerable to precisely the developing countries that had bor-
rowed from them . There have been recent comments that "Third World
countries recently attained unprecedented leverage because of their ability to
harm the western banking system ." 4e This provides an object lesson in inter-
national interdependence : Banks' recycling of OPEC funds led them to press
for easier credit policies within the United States, because their own survival
depended on the ability of their international borrowers to continue paying .
Both the symbolic and the real aspects of this crisis have been profoundly
educational . The high interest rates that were partly a response to OPEC pric-
ing policies turned out to give more leverage to the Third World through the
debt issue. Recently, Argentina and Brazil proposed rescheduling of part df
their debts on favorable and somewhat novel terms, and their proposals were
reluctantly accepted because of their inevitability .49
Under the circumstances, any attempt to alleviate the debt crisis con-
tributes as much to bracing the viability of the international banking system as
to any other aim ; it was in part this consideration that moved the United
States to support the 47 percent increase in IMFquotas, an increase that was
historically unprecedented and that under different circumstances many years
of negotiations would not have brought about.
A number of alternative liquidity measures have been proposed, some
reflecting a similar concern for the viability of the existing financial system,
and others expressing concerns for the borrowing countries . 5 ° Obviously these
debts have very serious impacts on countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina. Concerns have also been expressed about the social and political
consequences of painful austerity programs . However, it is equally obvious
that the survival of states is less tied to the repayment of their debt than is the
survival of the lending banks, especially as the crisis has precipitated an
understanding of the need to renegotiate some of the debt .
The debt crisis also contains an important lesson for debtor countries that
followed export-led strategies based either on more traditional commodities,
such as Brazil, or on oil, such as Mexico . As the international sectors of their
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economies expanded rapidly, and often inefficiently, their imports front in-dustrial countries soared and exceeded the revenues 'from increased exports.Furthermore, concentration on their export market led to a neglect of the sub-sistence sector, and a consequent dependence on food imports, as in the case ofVenezuela." The lesson is that development strategies based mostly on theresource exports have very high risks, as their success is tied to internationalterms of trade for primary commodities, which are notoriously volatile andunreliable . For example, the recent drop in the price of oil had severe conse-quences for the Mexican economy, which had been oriented to depend to agreat extent on the production and export of oil following a conventional vie,of development strategies .
The debt problem underscores the overall concern with liquidity in theworld economy ." This concern arises in part from the strict monetarist
regimes imposed by leading industrial economies in an attempt to combattheir domestic inflation . In this context, the issue of transfers to developingcountries has been replaced by a concern to develop better international finan-
cial tools. These are intended to alleviate deficits and the crippling interest
payments on debts, as well as to forestall the instability of financial agents inthe industrial countries with a very significant exposure . There is a general
unease about the adequacy of existing international financial institutions,
some ofwhich date as far back as the immediate postwar years." While the in-
ternational community discusses the possibility of updating its financial in-
stitutions, the recent changes in the world economy strain the capacities of ex-
isting ones to cope with the demands of the day, and therefore they anticipate
the emergency of newer and more adequate institutional arrangements."
Temporary liquidity measures, if targeted appropriately, could provide a
service to the industrial economies as a whole, allowing them to expand their
economies simultaneously, even if in a limited fashion . A problem that is
perceived at present is that each OECD country fears to implement expan-
sionary measures on its own, because it may worsen its relative position in
terms of inflation and exchange rates. The outcome is therefore worse than
that which could be attained if all were acting cooperatively. A temporary li-
quidity measure could encourage a more or less simultaneous, if limited, ex-
pansion.
An analysis of the impacts of the new financial proposals on the develop-
ing countries could be carried out within a framework similar to that used to
examine the older proposals on "transfer ." Both proposals have a common
feature : the desire to add initial endowments to the developing countries, in
the belief that such an addition will improve their position in the world
economy .
However, since the international economy is a market economy, an
analysis of changes in initial endowments is not complete unless its effects on
international market prices are understood . Such prices include the "terms of
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trade" between the North and the South, and therefore have a major in-
fluence on a number of policy concerns extending beyond the financial area,
such as export policies, investment, and growth . Any liquidity measure aim-
ing to alleviate outstanding debt must be significant, since the value of the
debt is itself rather significant for the economies concerned." Therefore, we
can expect that such a liquidity measure may have a nontrivial impact on
trade, as well as on demand and supply patterns in the countries concerned,
and one should examine the overall implications . As in the case of export-led
policies discussed above, the income effects of a transfer are likely to have a
significant impact on the welfare of the giver and of the receiver when the
market prices have adjusted to the new parameters .
The market responses to a transfer to the South may in some cases be
more helpful to the donor than to the receiver . Despite its counterintuitive
nature, this is in fact a classical proposition in trade theory, going back to the
work of Wassily Leontief in 1936 . The general problem of the welfare effects
of a transfer is one of the oldest in trade theory, starting with the work ofJohn
Stuart Mill .'6
A transfer may have a negative effect on the receiver if its effect on
market prices is to lower the terms of trade ofthe receiver . This happens if the
receiver's imports are an important component of its demand, because in such
a case the new "wealth" may be transformed into increased demand for im-
ports . This is akin to the income effect mentioned above . If the price ofthe im-
ports increases sufficiently, the receiver may find that despite the expansion of
its budget, it is less able to import and to consume than before."
For several years this problem was considered something of a curiosity
because it was established that in two-region economies it could occur only in
unstable markets. The phenomenon was therefore thought to be at worst tem
porary . However, it has recently been established that this problem arises very
generally in three-region economies, and that it also occurs with stable
markets, so that it may be quite persistent .''
The main result is that in a three-region world the receiver could be worse
off whenever the third region, which does not participate in the transfer, im-
ports the products in which the donor specializes . An example is an economy
with three regions: an industrial region, a newly industrialized region, and a
less-developed region . The industrial region makes a transfer to the less-
developed region ; the donor consumes mostly industrial goods and the
receiver basic goods. Under these conditions a transfer will make the receiver
worse off when the nonparticipant country imports industrial goods, in a
stable market."
A typical case where such conditions may be satisfied is when the in-
dustrial countries transfer goods or money to the lower-income LDC's, while
the newly industrializing countries, which do not participate in the transfer,
are net importers of industrial goods. This is clearly a plausible case . 60 The
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negative
	
impacts of transfers may happen quite independently of the
denomination of the transfer, which can be in industrial goods, in consump-tion goods, or in money .
This serves to show that overall reliance on transfers to decreasewealth differentials cannot be justified when part of the welfare of the coun-tries concerned depends on their positions in the international market, andon the international terms of trade.
It therefore seems worth indicating the economic policies that couldoffset the negative impacts of transfers. As the negative results apply to ex-change market economies, they may be avoided by appropriate supply
responses, such as changes in the levels of production . For example, thelosses from higher prices to imports may in part be offset if domestic pro-ducers increase their production of import substitutes . Decreased consump-
tion of imports could then be offset by higher output and employment . Inthe rather general case where the LDC receiving the transfer is an importer
of agricultural products from the North, then what is required is that thetransfer be accompanied by measures to increase domestic agricultural out-put. Thus, the negative impact of higher agricultural prices, which lowers
the volume of food imported and the domestic consumption of food, may
be offset, at least in part, by increases in domestic production of food . This
positive output response would in principle be consistent with profit max-
imizing behavior, because the producers would naturally increase their out-
put when faced with higher prices . What is at stake is the strength of this
output response, and the extent to which it can offset the negative price ef-
fect . This suggests the importance of positive measures addressed to im-
proving productivity in the agricultural or subsistence sector .
In sum, measures addressed to the correction of inequalities cannot be
based solely on aid flows, because these do not correct the basic difficulties
in the real side of the economy. Aid that does not raise the levels of pro-
ductivity will not lead to market structures adequate for sustaining
economic expansion. Transfer policies share with export-led policies a
misunderstanding about what constitutes an engine of development . Both
rely on engines located outside the regions, while sustainable development
also requires an increase in domestic productivity and stronger domestic
markets .
A more balanced view is required, one that sees the domestic popula-
tion not just as an input whose costs are to be minimized but rather as an
important component of the market itself. This is akin to widely accepted
prescriptions for industrial economies: The need to increase productivity
and output is emphasized by supply side economists, while the need to
strengthen domestic markets is a traditional Keynesian prescription .
,SOURCES AND NORTH-SOUTH TRADE
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The prices of extractive resources, and indeed of primary commodities
in general, have a
notorious history of volatility . In the 1950s and 1960s they
were also generally falling in real terms . The
1970s saw a departure from this
earlier pattern, with a shift of market power from consumers
to producers .
This was a response to unprecedentedly high levels of
industrial activity by
user countries, and to demand conditions generated
by decades oflow prices .
The oil market was of course the prime
example and set a trail that other
commodity producers sought to follow . Here a seller's market enabled OPEC
to overcome two decades of market
dominance by the buying cartel of major
oil companies, and to begin exercising significant market power on
behalf of
producers. Although the role of a monopoly on the buying side in holding
prices down has been noted for some years, 6' this point
has only lately
become generally accepted . Widely read publications in the United States
and the United Kingdom have commented recently that "in one sense
the
dramatic increase in oil prices in the mid-1970s represented a belated
recognition by the producers that the market had been rigged in the Western
interest,"" and that OPEC was formed initially as "a cartel to confront
a
cartel . "69 Indeed, it has not been only in resource markets that industrial
countries have been in a position to exercise market power. On the selling
side, they have been able to dominate the markets for products as diverse as
food, armaments, and various types of capital goods. 64 This recognition has
also dawned on other producers, creating a concern to ensure in the future
pricing policies that distribute the gains from resource trade more equitably
among buyers and sellers .
It has usually been taken as obvious that higher prices benefit exporters
and harm importers, and vice versa. In fact, this is not always true : There are
a number of powerful factors that tie together the interests of the two parties,
especially in the case of such an important input to production as oil . More-
over, the movements of prices in resource markets are strongly influenced by
the domestic economic policies of the industrial countries. As well as having
common interests in certain types of price movements, exporters and im-
porters therefore have a shared influence over these price movements . It is
then a very natural recommendation that they should design their economic
policies so as to use their joint influences over these markets to pursue these
common interests .
Higher resource prices, generally supposed to benefit exporters, may in
some cases benefit the importers as well . In addition, lower prices, usually
taken as beneficial to importers, may in some cases also benefit the exporter .
From this, it will emerge that there are circumstances under which both im-
porters and exporters gain from higher prices, and others under which both
gain from lower prices .
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To substantiate these points, consider the effects of alternative resource
prices on importer and exporter . Looking first at the importer, it is possible todistinguish three partial impacts of higher prices . The most obvious and mostlywidely acknowledged is of course the recycling effect, whereby higherrevenues from resource sales return to the importing countries as increased ex-
port demand or portfolio investment or, in the case of many non-oil exporting
developing countries during the 1970s, in the form of loans. The magnitude of
this effect, particularly in the case of oil prices, may be very substantial . Re-
cent estimates6s have suggested that up to 50 percent of the extra OPEC
revenues after the 1973 oil price increase were recycled to the OECD coun-
tries, and that the total effects of such spending would have been sufficient to
prevent a downturn in GNP in those countries, in the absence of other defla-
tionary effects . Other estimates suggest that the recycling of OPEC surpluses
as loans to non-oil LDCs has had a very positive effect on their rates of growth
and on their rate of investment as a proportion of GNP as well . For instance,
in the period 1973 to 1979, investment as a proportion of GNP increased in
I.DCs from 15 .7 to 23 .6 percent and LDCs investment as a proportion oftotal
world investment rose from 4.9 to 8 percent during this period .66
A second source ofcommon interest is the longer run conservation effect .
"there is an old saying that "the monopolist is the conservationist's best
friend," meaning simply that the higher prices supposed to result from
monopoly will reduce consumption and aid conservation .6I There have been
widespread concerns about the long-run implications of inefficient patterns of
extractive resource use, and about the way in which this may tighten global
constraints on long-run growth prospects. High prices, by encouraging effi-
cient use and the development of substitutes, will help to prevent or reduce
long-run shortages . The industrial countries, as the main users of resources,
will also be the main beneficiaries. There is therefore another dimension of
common interest here .
Probably by far the most important source of community of interest be-
tween importer and exporter is the one that is also least obvious. This is the
substitution effect, a medium-term effect that arises from the effect of a
resource price change on the internal equilibrium ofthe importing country. It
is most readily illustrated by reference to the effects of oil prices . However,
identical arguments can also be made about the effects of the price of any im-
ported primary input .
An increase in the price of an imported resource (such as oil) leads to in-
creases in the demands for other inputs such as domestic capital and labor.
Producers, wishing to produce at minimum cost, will change the factor mix so
as to use more labor or capital, whose price has not risen, and less of the
resource . At constant output levels, this would raise the demands for, and
employment of, domestic capital and labor. The returns to these factors in-
crease and therefore so do their total incomes. At the same time that producers
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switch from using resources to using capital and labor, consumers will also
change their demand patterns . They will turn away from resource-intensive
goods, whose prices have risen, and toward goods made mainly from other
less-expensive inputs, such as domestic capital and labor. This again tends to
increase the employment of, and rewards to, domestic capital and labor.
In the medium run, therefore, the increase in the price of a resource may
increase the employment and remuneration of those domestic factors that can
substitute for it . This is obviously a positive effect as far as the importing
economy is concerned.
To set against this substitution effect is a short-run wealth effect that is
more intuitively clear : The importing economy must part with more purchas-
ing power to import any given quantity of the resource, so that its real wealth
is reduced by the increase in the price of a good that it purchases. Even though
the impact of a price increase is negative before substitution takes place, in the
medium run it could be positive . There is also another short-run effect to con-
sider . When the exporter fixes the price of the resource and not the terms of
trade (as in the case of oil), the importing country can increase the price of its .
own exports in response to the rise in its import prices . This may offset even in
the short run the drop in real wealth . This point is of practical relevance: After
the oil price increases of both 1973 and 1979, the prices of OECD industrial
exports to OPEC countries increased by amounts quite sufficient to compen-
sate for much of the loss ofwealth from the higher oil prices . The magnitude of
the negative wealth effect may therefore be significantly reduced once we ac-
count for the export price responses of the importing country. However, in
general the wealth effect will reduce domestic aggregate demand and thereby
reduce the total demands for, and employment of, domestic factors . This con-
tractionary consequence of the higher oil price will of course tend to offset any
possible beneficial consequences of the substitution effect .
The important issue is therefore which of these effects dominates . There
is no general answer to this problem: No effect will uniformly dominate the
others . Each effect will predominate at a different set of initial prices . The
substitution effect will be more important quantitatively at low prices, the
wealth effect more so at high prices, and the recycling effect will predominate
when revenues are high . At intermediate prices their relative magnitudes will
switch in a way that depends upon the structural characteristics of the
economy . Although there are no completely general statements about the sizes
of wealth and substitution effects at all price levels, we nevertheless have
enough information to make the following important statement : At low
resource prices, when the substitution effect dominates, the importing country
will gain from an increase, and at high prices, when the wealth effect
dominates, it will gain from a reduction . At intermediate ranges, the results
require precise examination of the economic parameters of the importing
country.
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It is explained below that the exporting country will also gain in some
respects from an increase when prices are low, and from a decrease when they
are high . This will provide the basis for arguing that there is a "cooperative
band" of resource prices . Whenever prices are outside this range, both im-
porter and exporter will gain by moving into this range. If both traders are
aware of the full consequences of different pricing strategies, they will wish to
raise prices if they are lower than this band, or reduce them if they are higher .
This suggestion of a substantial community of interest is grounded on the
analysis of competitive market responses to resource prices . As such it is a rather
novel proposal and has far-reaching implications . It is therefore important to
understand exactly the framework from which it emerges: that of an industrial
economy with perfectly competitive domestic markets that respond to a given
world market price for a resource . This economy imports resources in exchange
for industrial goods. The resource exporter fixes the world price of the resource,
and so is a price setter . However, the resource exporter has no control over the
prices of the industrial goods it receives in exchange for resources : These are of
course influenced by the price of the resource . Hence the exporter cannot set the
terms oftrade between resources and industrial goods, which is the "real" price
of the resource . It can only set the resource price alone, a "nominal" price . The
reaction of the industrial market economy then determines the price of in-
dustrial goods and hence the terms of trade or the "real" resource price . 68 This
is a framework that is different from the conventional models ofmonopoly in the
world resource market, where it is assumed that the seller sets the "real" price
of the resource, that is, the terms of trade between this and the goods traded for
it . Equally, it is different from a fully competitive model where the resource ex-
porter is a price taker. It is a model where the price-setting power ofthe resource
exporter is mediated by the market's response, which is a price for the industrial
imports. The resource exporter can set any "nominal" price, but it has to live
with whatever real price is the market's response . The price of the resource is set
by the exporter ; the terms of trade are not. This seems to be an accurate
representation of the positions that many resource-exporting countries have, or
may aspire to . Certainly it describes OPEC's position well : OPEC member
countries have been able to fix the current dollar price of oil but have had to ac-
cept the current dollar prices of industrial exports with which the OECD
economies have responded. These have risen sufficiently sharply since 1973 to
make OPEC's gain in real oil prices a very small fraction of its gain in current
dollar prices .b 9 We are therefore concerned with comparing a short- and a
medium-term effect of resource prices . In the short run, the exporter fixes the
dollar price, but in the medium run it must accept a market-determined "real"
price for its resource-that is, the relative price of the resource with respect to
the price of industrial goods. Experience indicates that these short- and
medium-term price changes can be significantly different . Furthermore, when
compared with long-run real price adjustments, short-run price changes may
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lead to the opposite effects from those originally sought, as demand patterns and
production patterns shift in response to the original changes in dollar prices .
Short-, medium-, and long-run responses may be detected by considering the full
general equilibrium effects of a price change, in which all important variables-
such as income, supply, and demand- adjust, rather than by the more usual par-
tial equilibrium responses .
It is important to note that this analysis is entirely consistent with em-
pirical studies of the responses of importing countries to higher energy prices .
One phenomenon revealed by these studies is that higher energy prices have
on occasion led to increases in investment in importing countries, which is
precisely what is predicted by the substitution effect analyzed above. They
have also revealed regime changes in the response of industrial countries to oil
price increases, that is, qualitative changes in the nature of the response .'°
This is just as predicted by the interplay of wealth and substitution effects
outlined above: When substitution effects dominate there is one type of
response, and when wealth effects dominant there is another.
We turn now to an analysis ofthe reaction of the resource-exporting country
to different export price levels . It will again prove useful to distinguish different -
types of effect . This time the distinction is between the impact of a pricing policy
on the revenue from exports and the impact on the internal economic structure of
the exporting country . These are called revenue and structural effects."
The revenue effects are in part predictable . If the price increases from a
very low initial level, then the total revenue from sales will rise . This hardly
needs explaining . At very high prices, an increase will reduce revenues . This
is partly because high prices encourage substitution and so reduce demand
(the substitution effect referred to above), and partly because they lead to a
deflation of the consuming economy and so reduce demand via the income ef-
fect, also analyzed above.
In the intermediate price range, the revenue effects of a price change are
more complex and will depend on the structural characteristics ofthe consum-
ing economy. Precise results can be given (and are contained in the technical
papers, which can be obtained from the authors), but it is certainly clear that
at low prices the revenue effects of a price rise are beneficial to the exporter
and that at high prices they are harmful.
This analysis is couched in terms of the effect of a change in the money
price of oil on the real revenues of the exporter, by which we mean its revenues
denominated in terms of the goods it imports. This is important, as an in
crease in the price of a raw material will typically lead to rises in the price of
products embodying it . These consequential price changes have of course to
be considered when evaluating alternative pricing strategies .
The structural effects of a price change on the exporting country are more
complex and have both positive and negative aspects . They depend upon the
characteristics of both importing and exporting economies . A key variable
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here is the degree ofduality in these economies, where duality is measured essen-
tially by the differences between the factor-intensities of the various industries and
the level of real wages . An economy is dual in this sense if it contains very capital_
intensive industrial sectors and very labor-intensive traditional sectors .
The section on "Export-Led Strategies" explored the consequences of
such duality, together with either a labor supply that is highly responsive to
real wages or expenditure patterns leading to most wage income being spent
on labor-intensive goods. It was shown that under these conditions an expan-
sion of' international trade may harm the position of wage earners.
The effects of price changes on profits depend on the initial price level .
From a very low initial price, an increase in the price of the exported raw
material will lead to an increase in the profitability of domestic capital, and
also to an increase in the amount of capital employed . On the other hand, if
the initial price is high, the consequences of an increase are the opposite . In
these cases, the profitability and employment of domestic capital therefore in-
crease or decrease with the export price precisely when revenues increase or
decrease . The intuition behind this is rather clear: An increase in revenues
from exports raises domestic aggregate demand . This has a positive impact on
the demand for capital and leads to higher prices and employment of capital .
A decrease has the opposite effects . (Again, for intermediate price levels, one
must turn to the more detailed analysis of the technical papers .)
To summarize this discussion of the impact of pricing policies on a
dualistic resource-exporting country, we can state :
" Revenues increase when prices are increased from low levels or
decreased from high levels .
" Profitability and capital income increase when prices are increased
from low levels or decreased from high levels .
" Wages and wage income respond in the opposite sense to profits .
This summary applies only to price increases or decreases from low or high
initial levels respectively ; for changes from intermediate initial prices, more
complex statements apply . In particular, it can be shown that with in-
termediate initial prices, there are price mop ements that have beneficial conse-
quences for both revenues and wages. However, in general there may be a
conflict between profits and wages in a dual economy .
We have dealt above with the case of a dualistic resource-exporting coun-
try from the point of view of establishing a common interest between im-
porters and exporters-this is in fact the worst case . If, instead, the exporting
economy is homogenous, then in the situations described above real wages will
move with profits as resource exports vary . For example, a price increase from
low initial levels will increase revenues, profits, and wages . A decrease from
high initial levels will do likewise . This is one significant advantage of a
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homogeneous economy: Profits and wages generate positive externalities to
each other, so that they increase simultaneously in some cases . As a general
proposition a country stands to gain more from resource exports the more
homogenous are its technologies and the higher are its real wages. Indeed, the
greatest gains accrue to a homogenous, high-wage economy exporting
resources to a dualistic, low-wage country . So an industrial economy such as
Australia or Canada stands to gain from an expansion of mineral or fuel ex-
ports to South America or the Far East . A South American country, on the
other hand, is less likely to gain uniformly from expanding resource exports to
North America or Europe.
Obviously, there is indeed a significant community of interests between
buyers and sellers in the international markets for resources ; there are price
movements that will benefit buyers, and that will also benefit sellers in terms
of export revenues and capital income, though they may worsen the position
of labor in the selling countries. Having noted these connections, the next step
is to analyze the factors that actually influence price movements in these
markets . The interesting point here is the extent to which the domestic policies
of importing countries may affect resource prices . It is to be expected that an.
increase in demand will raise prices, and there is certainly evidence that
economic expansion of the consuming countries has affected the level of
resource prices . There are also both theoretical and empirical reasons for sup-
posing that such domestic policies as interest rate policies have a significant
impact on resource prices . Extractive resources have many of the character-
istics of assets such as stocks and bonds (this is rather clear of gold or silver),
and consequently equilibrium in their markets is described by the same kinds
of conditions as characterize equilibrium in asset markets. One such condition
is that all equivalent assets should yield their holders the same rate of return .
Now, the rate of return to a good that pays no dividend is simply the rate at
which its price appreciates, that is, the rate of capital gains that it produces .
The return to holding an extractive resource therefore depends upon the rate
at which its price increases, and market equilibrium requires that this rate be
related to the rates of return available on other assets . Such rates of return are
determined, interalia, by interest rates, so there is here a chain of connections
running from interest rates to the rates of change of resource prices . It can be
shown that whatever the market structure-competitive, imperfectly com-
petitive, or monopolistic-there will be a positive relationship between the
rate of change of resource prices and rates of interest .
This is just the well-known "Hotelling Rule, "72 which relates resource
price movements to interest rates. It establishes that in the long run, resource
prices will follow an upward trend that is related to the general level of interest
rates . Unanticipated changes in interest rates will lead to changes in this trend
of rate of increase, and also to abrupt changes in the level of resource prices .
There is an analogy here with the impact of interest rates on asset prices in
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general : Unanticipated changes in interest rates raise or lower the prices ofassets such as stocks and bonds. The rising long-run trend of resource prices
simply reflects their increasing scarcity, as the remaining stock becomes smaller.
This slightly surprising prediction has received extensive empirical
scrutiny, from which it has emerged essentially unscathed." From the point ofview of understanding the international economic system, the important point
is that the prices of extractive resources are not exogenous to the industrial
countries : Via the logic of the Hotelling Rule, they are strongly influenced by
their domestic economic policies . The domestic policies pursued by these
countries influence the prices they face in resource markets, so these prices
cannot be attributed solely to the actions of the sellers .
We can now pull the various strands of argument in this section together
to make a coherent whole . There are two important points . One is that the
issue of the pricing of internationally traded resources is not necessarily a
source of North-South conflict : There are several sources of common interest
and in consequence there can be situations wherea price movement is attrac-
tive to both sides of the market . Crucial here is the recognition that very low or
very high prices may be to nobody's benefit . In fact, they lead not only to
welfare losses but to instability . Low prices lead with a lag to an expansion of
demand and an upward pressure on prices ." The commodity price boom of
the early 1970s can be seen in part as a demand response to a period of low
prices . Similarly, high prices lead eventually to a very depressed market, as is
currently the case with oil, and thus to a "buyer's" market . It should be noted
that both exporters and importers are in a position to exercise influence over
price movements. The precise nature of the relationship between domestic
economic policies in the consuming countries and international price
movements is complex, but it can be set out in the detail needed for policy
analysis in each country . The general implication of these observations is once
again that national and international economic issues are intimately linked, so
that neither should be considered in isolation from the other. National and in-
ternational economic policies need to be formulated consistently, and the fact
that there are regions ofcommon interest should facilitate the establishment of
policies within which this can be done." Indeed the foregoing analysis makes
clear the main sources ofcommon interests (and the technical papers set out in
more detail the precise parameters of this common interest). Empirical in-
vestigation within this framework could provide a basis for numerical evalua-
tion of the effects discussed, and of the regimes within which cooperation
would be mutually beneficial, for a variety of extractive resources. These
would have to be economically important inputs, either individually as in the
case of oil, or in groups that can naturally be considered together, as in the
case of nonferrous, nonprecious metals . Otherwise, the impacts of their price
changes would be significant enough to produce the wealth, substitution, and
recycling effects necessary to make cooperative pricing policies possible .
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CONCLUSION : TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1980s
This chapter has touched upon a wide range of issues-on protectionism
and managed trade, on recent macroeconomic developments, and on North-
South interdependence via international financial markets, export-led
strategies, arms trade, and resource pricing . Although the scope is broad,
there have been a number of recurrent and unifying themes ; in fact, there is a
single theme that emerges strongly . This is that attention must be paid to
domestic economic structures in order to ascertain the impact of international
economic policies, and in order to understand how national markets interact
with each other through the international economy. Two particular features of
our analysis are economies of scale in industrial countries and the importance
of income effects resulting from price changes in developing country markets.
In a broad range of situations, a consequence of these features is that certain
conventional and widely adopted policies have results that are quite the op-
posite of those expected . Therefore alternative policies are required, and we
have suggested general guidelines .
The increased importance of economies of scale influences the macro-
economic performance and policies of the industrial countries . In particular, it
affects the stability of markets, the possibility of smooth structural change, and
of mutually beneficial and balanced trade. Increasing returns are an impor-
tant link between the emergence of stagflation and of problems connected with
trade imbalances and structural change at the international level. Restrictive
monetary policies may be less efficient in controlling inflation, and may im-
pose high efficiency losses in terms of plant closures and unemployment .
Equally, the traditional presumptions that favor across-the-board liberaliza-
tion trade are no longer operative in this case . We offered guidelines for in-
dustrial policies and the management of trade for economies with increasing
returns to scale.
The second important feature of domestic economies that we singled out
was income effects in developing countries. If substantial, income effects may
reverse traditional links between domestic and international markets . An in
crease in the export of primary commodities, even if due to an expansion of
demand, may lower the earnings of those producing them . This occurs
precisely when the income effects are large relative to the substitution or price
effects . The same issue arises with resource prices : The effects of these on
welfare in the consuming and producing countries depend on the relative
magnitudes of income and substitution effects . We have argued, and this is an
argument backed by empirical evidence, 16 that circumstances where income
effects dominate are in fact likely to arise frequently in markets of importance
to developing countries .
We have also argued that the level of interdependence in the world
economy has increased very significantly . We discussed the impact ofresource
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prices on international financial flows, including the loans that recycled OPEC
revenues to rapidly growing developing countries. These loans made the bor-
rowing countries particularly vulnerable to changes in domestic monetary
policies in the industrial countries . Reciprocally, they made the bankin g
system in those countries vulnerable to the policies of borrowing countries . In
any case, the evidence suggested that the developing countries had a signifi-
cantly higher level of growth and investment than the industrial countries over
the last ten years, despite the high oil prices .
Our next step is to give an integrated review, with examples . First con-
sider the domestic macroeconomic policies ofthe industrial market economies,
whose sluggish performance in recent years has adversely affected export earn
ings of many developing countries. We argued here for selective expansionary
fiscal and industrial policies, associated with low interest rates . Clearly, the ex-
pansion must be directed toward those sectors with the greatest potential for
cost reductions from scale economies. However, there is a danger that an at-
tempt at rapid expansion of output in these sectors will cause bottlenecks in the
markets for labor and other inputs, with inflationary consequences . Because of
this, the directed expansion would need to be associated with policies to en-
courage the availability of appropriate inputs into these sectors . These might
involve subsidies to the retraining of labor and to labor mobility, and also to
related capital expenditures . It is important to note that there are positive and
negative policy responses to the need for structural change . The positive
response is that outlined above: Encourage the sectors with potential and also
expedite reallocations from sectors with lower to those with higher potential ."
A negative response is to subsidize declining sectors to keep them in being. 'e If
the underlying loss of comparative advantage is permanent, then this latter
response can only lead to a cycle ofdeclining efficiency and of rising subsidies.
Public resources are in general much more productive when spent facilitating
the growth of emerging industries with potential for cost reductions than in at-
tempting to maintain an existing declining industrial base .
Finally, we consider the relationship of developing countries with the in-
ternational market system . Here, one of the main thrusts of our analysis has
been to warn against the dangers of excessive dependence on international
markets as an engine of growth, especially with respect to traditional exports .
The outcome of participation in such markets is extremely sensitive to
domestic markets and technological structures, and in particular to the impor-
tance of the income effects already mentioned . If these income effects are
substantial, and there are reasons to believe that in many cases they are, then
involvement in international markets for primary commodities can lead to a
country becoming trapped in a self-reinforcing position of dependence . An ex-
cessive international orientation leads to dependence on imports and to a
vulnerability to balance-of-payments deficits during cyclical downswings, such
as the present . Such payments deficits lead to pressures from international
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organizations for restrictive domestic policies and for devaluations, both with
a view to emphasizing export-led policies . As discussed above, these may in-
crease further the international orientation of the economy and undermine its
growth and distribution of income . Ultimately, developing countries would
fulfill a service role in the international economy, as suppliers ofcheap exports
to the industrial countries .
On the other hand, stronger domestic markets, and a more integrated
and productive technological structure, may lead to positive outcomes of
export-led policies . More participation in international markets for primary
commodities may be beneficial to the exporter in this case . This suggests two
important policy conclusions . One is that involvement in international
primary commodity markets should be undertaken only after a careful review
of domestic economic structures and their likely interaction with the interna-
tional market . These structures are not unchangeable, and they could be sub-
ject to influence by suitable policy measures in the labor market and in the
field of choice of productive technique, both with a view to strengthening
domestic markets . Another suggestion to emerge clearly is that there may be
substantial advantages to exporting goods that are not very labor intensive, as
the potentially harmful income effects are less likely to arise with these.
Overall, the point is that the structure of domestic markets is an important
determinant of the outcome of international trade, so that a strengthening of
these markets, by reducing technological dualism and the elasticity of labor
supplies and improving overall productivity, is a valuable preliminary to
greater involvement in international markets. The traditional view of cheap
labor as the main relative advantage of developing countries is therefore not a
good basis for the formulation of economic strategies . The most successful
export-led growth examples of the last decades (for example, Japan, Taiwan,
Korea, Germany) had highly educated and productive labor, with
corresponding living standards. Widespread poverty is not a relative advan-
tage, but is rather a weakness . When participating in international markets, a
country with a better bargaining position is one where the local population is
viewed as prospective customers rather than only as a source of cheap labor. A
more integrated approach is required, viewing the local population as belong-
ing to both sides of the market : both as consumers (demand) as well as inputs
(supply) . This approach exhibits very clearly the practical importance ofbetter
distributions of income .
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